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Manning v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 (May 7, 2015)1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Summary 
 
 The Court held that it is a constitutional error when the district court fails to notify and 
confer with the parties when the court receives and responds to a note from the jury indicating 
that they are deadlocked.  The Court further held such error will be reviewed for harmlessness 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
Background 
 
 Malcolm Manning was arrested and charged with burglary, battery with intent to commit 
a crime with a victim 60 years of age or older, and robbery with a victim 60 years of age or 
older, all stemming from the robbery of an ABC Beer and Wine Store in Las Vegas.  At trial, the 
jury retired for deliberations late in the day.  An hour later, the jury sent the judge a note stating 
that they were deadlocked 10-2 in favor of conviction.  The judge instructed the marshal to tell 
the jury they were to come back the next day and continue deliberating.  The court did not tell 
the parties of the note until the next day after the jury returned a guilty verdict.   
 Upon learning of the jury’s note, Manning filed a motion for a new trial.  He argued the 
court’s failure to provide him with notice that the jury considered itself deadlocked deprived him 
of his right to request a mistrial.  The court denied Manning’s motion.  Manning was found 
guilty and sentenced to 6 to 15 years.  Manning appealed.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Manning argued that the district court’s failure to notify the parties after receiving the 
jury’s note was a constitutional error.  The Court reviewed these constitutional issues de novo.  
 First, the Court looked to recent Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit cases involving similar 
issues.  The Ninth Circuit has held, “that a district court’s failure to notify defense counsel about 
a jury’s inquiry during deliberations violates the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel 
during a critical stage of trial.”2 The Third Circuit has also held that this is a constitutional 
violation.3  The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit, holding that, “the court 
violates a defendant’s due process rights when it fails to notify and confer with the parties after 
receiving a note from the jury.” 
                                                        
1  By Scott Lundy.  
2  See Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 840–43 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the presence of the defendant and 
counsel is required when formulating a response to a jury’s inquiry, the importance of which is heightened in 
instances of a deadlocked jury.); United States v. Barragan-Devis, 133 F.3d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
a constitution gives defendants the right to participate in a district court’s decision to communicate back to the jury 
and the communication itself.); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1468–69 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding, “the 
failure of the court to notify appellants or their counsel of the jury’s deadlock vote, and the court’s ex parte message 
to the jury to continue its deliberations, violated appellants’ constitutional rights.”).  
3  See United States v. Toliver, 330 F.3d 607, 616–17 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights are violated when a judge fails to notify defense counsel of a note from the jury and fails to allow 
counsel to argue prior to a response to the jury.).   
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 However, the Court said Manning is incorrect in arguing that such a constitutional 
violation requires an automatic reversal.  Following the Ninth Circuit’s rule, the Court held that, 
“when a district court responds to a note from the jury without notifying the parties or counsel or 
seeking input on the response, the error will be reviewed to determine if it was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  The Court used the Ninth Circuit’s three-factor test in determining the 
harmlessness of the error: (1) the probable effect of the message actually sent; (2) the likelihood 
that the court would have sent a different message had it consulted with appellants beforehand; 
and (3) whether any changes in the message that appellants might have obtained would have 
affected the verdict in any way.4   
 The Court concluded that the district court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The district court’s message back to the deadlocked jury was “simple and did not contain 
any legal instructions.”  The Court did not believe that the involvement of the defendant or his 
counsel would have resulted in any substantive differences.  Finally, the Court concluded that the 
marshal was unlikely to have altered the message in any prejudicial manner.  Because the court 
was simply informing the jury it would continue deliberations the next day, the error does not 
warrant reversal.   
 The Court then briefly dealt with Manning’s other claims and concluded they all lacked 
merit. First, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to use four of its five peremptory 
challenges to exclude females from the jury.  Second, Manning’s rights under the Confrontation 
Clause were not violated when the court admitted evidence of the State’s efforts to locate a 
nontestifying witness who made out-of-court testimonial statements about Manning because the 
evidence did not refer to any testimonial statement.  Third, Manning’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause were not violated when the court admitted hearsay statements from prison 
phone calls because Manning had waived his Confrontation Clause argument when he waived 
redaction of the phone calls.  Fourth, the trial court did not err in admitting Manning’s phone 
calls from jail because they “evidenced consciousness of guilt.”  Fifth, the prosecutor’s 
statements during closing arguments regarding the nontestifying witness did not constitute a 
plain error because the prosecution was making inferences from admitted evidence and 
testimony.  Sixth, the trial court’s refusal to correct the prosecution’s insinuation that Manning 
essentially admitted guilt during the course of his jail phone calls did not need to be addressed 
because the Court had previously held the phone calls were properly admitted.  Seventh, the trial 
court did not err in admitting the in-court identification.  Eighth, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing Eric Sahota, a forensic scientist who reviewed the fingerprints in this case, 
to also testify about the surveillance video from the store.  Ninth, Manning’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause were not violated when an officer testified that he was “informed” 
Manning was a possible suspect, rather than stating the police “developed” him as a possible 
suspect.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held the district court’s failure to notify Manning or his counsel about the 
deadlocked jury’s note was a constitutional error. The Court, however, concluded the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on all 
counts.   
                                                        
4  See Barragan-Devis, 133 F.3d at 1289; Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1470.  
